Original Japanese written by staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the December 10^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper and the December 11^th edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

TEPCO has discovered that the density of contaminated water stored within an underground tunnel known as a “duct” at its Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) has risen by some 4,000 to 4,100 times since a year before. The NPP houses some facilities called “waste processing buildings” around which there are underground tunnels known as “ducts.” They still store some 400 to 500 tons of contaminated water which originated both from sea water from the tsunami of March 2011, and from other sources. The power company collected some samples of this contaminated water and inspected them on December 3^rd, 2015 They detected 482,000 becquerel of radioactive cesium per liter (0.254 gallon) and some 500,000 becquerel of radioactive substances that emit the b ray. Compared to a previous inspection in December 2014, the contaminant concentration has, on the average, increased by some 4,000 to 4,100 times.
The “waste processing buildings” next to the duct in question temporarily store high-density contaminated water used to cool the melting down nuclear fuels.
TEPCO is trying to identify the cause of this drastic rise in the concentration of radioactive substances. One possibility is that the highly contaminated water in the waste processing building has leaked and run into the duct. Since the underground water around the duct shows no sign of a rise in the concentration of radioactive substances, the contaminated water has not leaked out of the duct, according to the power company.

Since there is no way that the density of radioactive substances “naturally” rise, one has every reason to suspect that there are some cracks somewhere in a joint of the processing building or a water stop through which high-density contaminated water runs. The power company has to identify the cause and resolve it as soon as it can. Otherwise, the water’s contamination density can keep skyrocketing.

Also, with almost five years passed since the March 2011 meltdown, the NPP’s waste storage buildings and tanks of contaminated water should deteriorate further with aging. At Fukushima Daiichi, the support columns of exhaust towers show rust and deformities, breaking at multiple places. Experts say they are in danger. The radioactive contamination around such a tower is as high as 25,000mSv/hr, which will kill you in only a dozen minutes or so. If any of the towers collapse now, more radioactive substances will be released. Urgent countermeasures are a must, according to the February 20, 2015 edition of the Akahata newspaper.

Meanwhile, at Chernobyl, “sealed up” Unit 4 is now posing a serious threat, 29 years after the disaster. The sarcophagus—the cement and steel structure that encases the destroyed reactor at the power station in Chernobyl—is aging and part of the walls and the roof are already beginning to collapse. This can lead to re-leakage of radioactive substances. Thus, they are building a structure that wraps the whole sarcophagus. The structure can last some 100 years, according to sources. Radioactive contamination, meanwhile, can last at least ten times that, judging from the half lives of many radioactive substances. This means they will need to re-build such a structure at least ten times.

The decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi has been haunted by one problem after another, and such problems can grow even tougher in the years ahead. Is the decommissioning possible, at all? Currently no one knows the correct answer to this question.

NPPs carry such serious risks. I believe that more people need to know the truth about nuclear power. Once a person knows the truth, he/she can form their own ideas about nuclear power and then put them into practice. To make that happen, the Project on Nuclear Power and Radiation intends to spread what is happening here in Fukushima as factually as possible and in the easiest possible way to understand.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the December 9^th, 2015 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper)
▼Click the image and read the caption.

Kansai Electric Power intends to extend the lives of Units 1 and 2 of the Takahama NPP, which are now more than 40 years old. The Nuclear Regulation Authority has been examining the case. One major issue there is fireproofing of the power cables, more than 1,000km (625 miles) in total length. Kansai Electric proposed to cover such cables with fireproof sheets, among other measures.
Japan’s new regulations on NPPs require fireproof cables. The two 40-year-old units in question, however, do not employ such cables. Kansai Electric, therefore, needs to take some measures to provide similar fireproofing. The power company applied to the Authority for permission to extend the two units’ lives by 20 years.
Kansai Electric has presented a plan both to cover some cables with fireproof sheets and to replace cables conducting high-voltage current with flame-resistant cables. An examination meeting of the Authority has approved most of such safety plans.
The two units at Takahama need to complete their examinations for life prolongation. Now, the greatest issue, fireproofing of cables, is almost solved. The final approval to the life extension of Units 1 and 2 is in sight.
The issue of power cables not being fire resistant can be found at many other old NPPs as well. Thus, many other old NPPs will have to resort to similar safety measures.

Actually, with this issue of fire proofing cables, Kansai Electric made a big “flamer” of itself before. To the measures it proposed earlier, the Nuclear Regulation Authority responded with very harsh criticisms, saying: “There is no evidence of safety,” and “Not trustable,” on May 26^th, 2015.

(Quote from the relevant article of the Asahi Shimbun’s May 27^th, 2015, edition.)
“In its examinations of whether or not to permit the restart of Kansai Electric Power’s Units 1 and 2 of the Takahama NPP, the Nuclear Regulation Authority, on May 26^th, harshly rebuked—“There is no evidence of safety,” “Not trustable,” etc.—the power company’s claim that painting non-fireproof cables with some special paint can satisfy the required fireproof standard. At the examination meeting held that day, the power company said it had confirmed that covering up cables with fireproof paint or with fireproof sheets would provide enough fire resistance. To this claim, the examiners of the Authority responded with a harsh rebuke, saying: “The experiment data are too small in quantity and provide no proof. With such little data, we are unable to make an objective judgment.” The examiners also pointed out examples where some fireproofing paint, tried by some other NPPs, crumbled, saying: “Cable maintenance and control have been utterly miserable so far. How can we trust you when you say you will thoroughly tighten up your control of cables?” Kansai Electric replied repeatedly, “We will make more detailed explanations.”

Elsewhere, at TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP (Niigata), some cables to the safety equipment were, against the new regulations, not separated from other cables. However, in the examination papers TEPCO submitted to the Authority for Units 6 and 7, the power company wrongly claimed that “some measures were taken for safety” with respect to the cables in question.
(From an article of the December 9^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushim Minpo newspaper)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

The Authority’s examinations are a prerequisite to the restart of a NPP. However, the Authority did not expect an electric company to include an untrue statement in the application documents. Thus, the Authority did not confirm the state of the cables in question at the sites. This reveals serious limitations to the examinations conducted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority.

The new regulations for NPPs require that the cables to/from safety equipment be separated from the other cables. Boards or some other objects must stand in between those two types of cables. At Units 6 and 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, however, at least 296 cables in all were not protected by separation.
Still, the application for approval of the work plan, submitted in September 2013 by TEPCO, who wants to restart the two units, explicitly stated that “the two types of cables are laid down with separate cable trays and conduits,” and “we have taken measures to alleviate mutual interferences between the two types, keeping the two independent of each other.”
In reality, TEPCO did some faulty work, for instance, placing cables of different types in trays that also held cables to the safety equipment. The power company said, “We wrongly believed that we had taken the right measures. We did not confirm that sufficiently.”
The Authority, in August, chose Kashiwazaki-Kariwa’s Units 6 and 7 as priority units to examine, among all the boiling water reactors subject to inspection. (Fukushima Daiichi is another example of boiling water reactors.) The Authority, however, was unaware of this cable placement issue, until TEPCO reported on it in September 2015. Similar problems have been discovered at Unit 4 of Chubu Electric Power’s Hamaoka NPP and at Unit 1 of Hokuriku Electric Power’s Shika NPP.

At Chernobyl, some structural problems and human errors worked together to create one of the worst NPP accidents in human history. It is now evident that, prior to the disaster, the relevant parties gave precedence to economy over safety and covered up many wrongdoings.
On December 26^th, 1985, the Soviets celebrated an anniversary of the nuclear power industry, and they hoped to finish off Unit 4 of the Chernobyl plant by then. To accelerate the building work, therefore, they replaced some inflammable heat-resistant material with a flammable one, which was one factor that helped spread radioactive substances.

Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority’s examinations can seriously affect the future of everyone in Japan. While pressure from the national government is affecting the Authority’s inspections and judgments as the government turns back to nuclear power, Japan’s general society is not responding as it should. To me, this looks like the calm before a deadly storm.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the December 13, 2015 editions of the Asahi Shimbun and Akahata newspapers)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Modi, on December 12, 2015, and reached a “basic agreement” to sign a nuclear agreement between the two nations which would enable Japan to export both its nuclear technology and its bullet train technology to India.

A nuclear agreement permits the signing countries to im/export radioactive substances and nuclear technologies only for peaceful use. Currently, Japan has signed such an agreement with 14 countries and regions. The negotiations with India began five years ago, in 2010.
India plans to build 40 more nuclear power plants (NPPs) by 2032, and expand its NPPs’ power generation capacity to 63 million kW, more than ten times greater than what the nation has today. India has already signed a nuclear agreement with the US, France, and others. Here we have to note that all the pressure vessels of reactors from the US or France are made in Japan. Thus, in reality, unless India signs such a deal with Japan as well, its agreements with the US and France become meaningless.
Now, India has conducted nuclear bomb tests before, and it is not part of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Many, therefore, are calling for a more cautious attitude to the India-Japan agreement, including, among others, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who jointly petitioned to suspend the negotiations for the agreement, in that the proposed agreement “generates suspicions that the imported nuclear technologies will be used in the development of nuclear weapons.” Also, inside Japan, many are saying that “the nation should not export a NPP,” considering the disaster that the meltdown of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi caused.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India owns nuclear weapons, some 90 to 110 such weapons as of January 2015. NPPs imported from Japan can help India develop more nuclear warheads. In the negotiations, Japan has been claiming the deal is compatible with the non-proliferation policy, saying that the deal lets the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) inspect to prevent any military use of nuclear technologies imported from Japan. Also, if India holds a nuclear bomb test, Japan will suspend its cooperation with India, says Japan. However, the IAEA is capable of inspecting only some of the nuclear facilities in India, not all of them.
Thus, no one can guarantee whether or not India is honest in its announcements.
Moreover, India has been in tension with its neighbor, Pakistan. Once the border situation changes, India might resume its nuclear bomb tests and/or expand its nuclear weapons.

Once contaminated with radioactivity, no human and no part of nature can return to a contamination-free state again. The fallout from Fukushima Daiichi and the damages caused from the fallout can harm many for ages to come, and no human can predict how many generations will be victimized. In the years to come, the meltdown might well contaminate much of the Pacific and beyond, as many fear.

Today, Japan has yet to resolve the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe while, under pressure from some pro-nuke people inside Japan, the government eagerly attempts to sell NPPs to a country with nuclear weapons. I do believe this should not be tolerated.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the December 4^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

The local governments of Fukushima Prefecture and Tomioka and Naraha Towns have decided to accommodate the Japanese government’s plan to bury the “specified waste” from TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) in controlled disposal sites in Tomioka Town and elsewhere, Fukushima Prefecture. The burying is expected to begin in June 2016, at the earliest.

Here, “specified waste” refers to waste containing 8,000 becquerels or more of radioactive cesium per kg (per 2.2 lb.), and which has been specified by Japan’s Minister of the Environment as such waste. Where should such waste go? In compliance with the nation’s Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Pollution by Radioactive Materials, such waste is categorized according to its radioactive substance contents, and each category is buried in a different site. Waste containing 8,000 becquerels or more and up to 100,000 becquerels of radioactive cesium per kg (per 2.2 lb.) are to be buried in “Fukushima Eco Tech Clean Center,” a controlled disposal site located in Tomioka Town. High-density waste, containing more than 100,000 becquerels, needs to be kept within a containment disposal facility surrounded by concrete walls. Since there is currently no such facility in Fukushima Prefecture, such waste from Fukushima Daiichi are to be buried in storage dedicated to such waste at an interim storage facility to be built in Okuma and Futaba Towns. Meanwhile, the contaminated soil collected in the decontamination work is not treated as “specified” and is to be kept in such interim storage facilities regardless of its density of radioactive substances.

(*1 “Becquerel” is a unit of measurement of radioactivity. If an atom’s nucleus decays and emits radiation every one second, it is counted as “1 becquerel.” Now, “radioactivity” is the capability to emit radiation, and “becquerel” measures such capability, while “sievert” (Sv) is about the radiation dose a human is exposed to. Where there is a single source of radiation (becquerel), the actual radiation dose people are exposed to (sievert) from the source can differ, depending on situational conditions—the kind of the radioactive substance in the source, the distance between the source and a person, the effectiveness of the shield (if any) between the two, and so on. Meanwhile Japan’s Food Sanitation Act defines some tentative regulations on radioactive substances contained in foods. 1kg (2.2 lb.) of drinking water or milk must not contain more than 200 becquerels of radioactive iodine. 2,000 becquerels for vegetables. For radioactive cesium, no more than 200 becquerels per 1kg (2.2 lb.) of drinking water or milk, and no more than 500 becquerels per the same weight of vegetables, cereal, meat, eggs, etc. The Act demands of municipalities that any foods containing radioactive substances in excess of those limits should not be consumed by humans.)

While there is a national plan to build storage facilities for “specified waste” in six prefectures of Japan, Fukushima has become the first to accommodate such a facility. In the other targeted prefectures, many residents around a planned facility site are opposed to the plan, making it lag behind schedule. Fukushima’s decision to accept the national plan might provide a model of consensus building, and many are concerned over such “consensus” building.

(Based on articles from the November 29^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

Turning our eyes to final disposal facilities of high-level radioactive substances (“nuclear waste”), the Fukushima Minpo newspaper reported, in its November 29, 2015 edition, on a survey conducted by Kyodo News with all of the 47 prefectural governments of Japan about such facilities. None of the 47, including Fukushima, is willing to accommodate such a final disposal facility.

The survey found 13 prefectures replying “no intention to accommodate (such a facility) at all,” and the 13 included Fukushima. Of them, four are currently accommodating a NPP or more. Eight others said “it is hard to accommodate (such a facility),” while 24 others responded with no policy about such facilities. The Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the Nuclear Waste Management Organization of Japan (NUMO) are planning to announce some “scientifically” hopeful candidate sites, i.e., sites considered to be “scientifically” acceptable for accommodating a final disposal facility. In the current situation, however, such an announcement can invite harsh objections from the citizens of those “candidate” sites.

So far, Japan’s national government has been developing nuclear power policies while postponing decisions on what to do with radioactive waste management. This is the time when we should decide what to do with the final disposal of nuclear waste. Every municipality, as well as every citizen, needs to consider this grave issue. Considering this issue can help many reconsider whether nuclear power is truly necessary or not, which would lead to reconsideration of the energy policies of the Japanese government.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on an article from the November 19^th, 2015 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper)

▼Click the image to read the caption.

–Thyroid cancer found in “many” children—or not–
Opinions by
Prof. Toshihide Tsuda, environmental epidemiology, Okayama University Graduate school of Medicine
Mr. Shoichiro Tsugane, Director, Research Center for Cancer Prevention and Screening, National Cancer Center

Following the meltdown of the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), the Fukushima Prefectural Government has been conducting thyroid examinations of children. The examinations have so far determined that 104 children examined have thyroid cancer. Are those “many” cases of the cancer ascribable to radiation, or not? Here, two epidemiology experts with contradictory opinions describe their respective viewpoints.

・Toshihide Tsuda, environmental epidemiology, Okayama University Graduate School of Medicine

Some people claim that those thyroid examinations have resulted in some “over-diagnosis, which counts very slowly growing cancer that will actually never fully develop during the lifetime of the patient.” Yet the claim of “over-diagnosis” would imply that an unnecessary thyroid cancer operation has been conducted in more than a hundred children. In fact, however, a report by Fukushima Medical University shows that, in some 40% of those 96 children confirmed to have thyroid cancer and who were operated on at the University’s hospital, the cancer had spread outside the thyroid. In more than 70% of them, the cancer had metastasized to lymph nodes.
Also, Fukushima Prefecture and the northern Kanto Region have population densities several times greater than that of Chernobyl, which explains why exposure to low-level radiation has caused this many cases of thyroid cancer.
A major outbreak of thyroid cancer cases is expected. We need to prepare the health care system to face it. Pregnant women and infants can rest in, or move to, somewhere with much lower levels of radiation. Any policy must be postponed that intends to bring evacuees back into the “specified evacuation zones.” Also, we need to survey cancer cases in the northern Kanto Region as well.
The role science has to play, in this particular case, is to predict what can happen in the future based on data available and suggest what measures should be taken for the sake of the affected residents, before it is too late.

• Shoichiro Tsugane, Director, Research Center for Cancer Prevention and Screening, National Cancer Center

At this moment, it is rational to ascribe those “many” cases to “over-diagnosis.”

Since over-diagnosis seems quite probable, thyroid examinations should not spread beyond Fukushima Prefecture. Such expanded examinations might save one patient, while many more would be diagnosed as having cancer that would actually be difficult to diagnose otherwise. Then, if many such people were given cancer treatments, they would experience many disadvantages, including changes to their lifestyles. In case of Fukushima’s children with detected cancer, we should consider the option of wait-and-see. Less than one patient under 40 years of age dies of thyroid cancer in Fukushima Prefecture, according to the mortality ratios there.
We need to continue the current examinations and rationally analyze influences from radiation. This is something the national government should do.

(Opinion of the staffer writing this.)
I live in Koriyama City, Fukushima Prefecture, where we still have many “hot spots,” here and there—small places with high radiation doses—more than four years after the meltdown began. We who live here are unable to completely avoid exposure to low radiation doses.
Living in a place like this, I am seriously worried that the national government will delay implementation of countermeasures by postponing its admission that the many cases of child thyroid cancer here are ascribable to exposure to radiation,. Such a delay can lead to more children falling victims to radiation-caused diseases.
Of course, the diagnosis and treatment of child thyroid cancer should be conducted carefully. At the same time, the national government needs to take more measures both to help people avoid more radiation exposure and to facilitate care to people already exposed.
In the year of the Chernobyl disaster, the number of cases of child thyroid cancer expanded in number. Medical doctors there told the whole world about this. The IAEA’s survey of 1990 to 1991, however, denied that there were “many” such incidents, saying that surveys in Hiroshima and Nagasaki showed that more than a decade is necessary for child thyroid cancer to develop. Thus, it was more than a decade after the disaster, before they admitted many occurrences of such cancer. This attitude of the IAEA drastically reduced the amount of help offered to Chernobyl from the rest of the world.
Belarus has nine recuperation facilities aided by its national government. They are meant to enhance the immunity of those children exposed to radiation and help such children remove radioactive substances from their bodies. Many are still in recuperation at those facilities, and the effects of recuperation are obvious in almost all of those children, according to reports. I believe Japan’s government should also learn from those examples and come up with government-funded recuperation programs.
We adults are responsible for our children’s health. We should not let radiation exposure cast dark shadows over the futures of such children. I do believe, therefore, that we adults have to take any measures we can to protect such children.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the October 27^th and November 5^th editions of the Fukushima Minpo and Asahi Shimbun newspapers)

▼Click each image and read the caption.

Governor Tokihiro Nakamura of Ehime Prefecture, on October 26^th, announced his agreement to the planned restart of Unit 3, Ikata Nuclear Power Plant of the Shikoku Electric Power Company (“NPP,” Ikata Town, Ehime). This is the second case where the governor of a prefecture where a NPP is located has agreed to the restart of the NPP (following that of Kyushu Electric Power’s Sendai NPP (Units 1 and 2), located in Satsumasendai City, Kagoshima Prefecture). Both restarts come after Japan has instituted its new regulatory standards for NPPs. In the coming months, the Nuclear Regulation Authority is to conduct examinations and follow the necessary approval procedures. Ikata NPP is expected to restart in or after January 2016.

More than four years have passed since the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown began, and still some 70,000 citizens of Fukushima Prefecture are in evacuation. Learning from this tragedy, the new regulatory standard legally requires that an evacuation plan has to be prepared for the residents who live within 30km (18.7 miles) of a NPP. Basically, the hosting and neighboring municipalities should draft such a plan, prepare for possible evacuations, and lead the affected residents in the case of a major accident. This time, however, the governor has won consent for the planned restart from the hosting municipality alone. Also, Japan has yet to secure a place for a final disposal site for high-level radioactive waste from reprocessed nuclear fuels. In spite of all these grave issues being unresolved, the restart procedure is already in process.

In reaching the agreement, Governor Nakamura successfully made Prime Minister Shinzo Abe pledge that the “national government should take responsibilities.” Located at the root of “Japan’s thinnest peninsula,” Sata Misaki Peninsula, Ikata NPP poses serious difficulties for residents should they need to evacuate in the case of a major accident. Considering how great and serious the devastations caused by the Fukushima meltdown are, it is obviously necessary to insist that the national government make evacuation plans and secure the implementation of such plans, for example, through amendments to the Disaster Countermeasure Basic Act.

Amid those moves and issues, the Nuclear Regulation Authority on November 4, 2015, decided to submit a recommendation to the Minister of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology, who is responsible for the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor. One control and managerial error after another has occurred at the breeder reactor. The recommendation claims that the current operator of Monju, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, is “not up to the job” and, therefore, argues that the Minister should find another operator within a half year or so. In case the Minister fails to do so, one possible option is to decommission the breeder reactor. This is the first recommendation the recently installed Authority has ever submitted.

We have yet to see any conclusion to Fukushima’s radioactive contamination problems. With numerous problems remaining unresolved, there are nevertheless moves to restart Japan’s existing NPPs. I pray there never be another Fukushima.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Source: articles of October 21^st, 2015 editions of the Fukushima Minpo and Asahi Shimbun newspapers)

▼Click each image to enlarge it and read the caption.

Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare, on October 20^th, announced that it had certified an ex-worker—who worked at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi NPP after the disaster and who developed leukemia—as qualifying for worker’s compensation. This was the first case ever of such certification which recognized a cause-effect relationship between exposure to radiation caused by a NPP accident and a disease.

According to the certified ex-worker, a 41-year-old male resident in the City of Kitakyushu, he was engaged in structural installation and welding around Units 3 and 4 of Fukushima Daiichi, in 2012 to 2013, as a worker employed by a business partner of TEPCO. Then, in January 2014, he was diagnosed with acute myelocytic leukemia. His accumulated exposure dose was around 15mSv from Fukushima, and an additional 4mSv or so from Kyushu Electric Power’s Genkai NPP, where he served during a regular checkup for around three months in 2012.

The certification needed to qualify for worker’s compensation for leukemia requires that the worker had an annual exposure dose of 5mSv or more, his/her leukemia emerged at least one year after the last exposure, and there was no evident cause of the leukemia other than the exposure at work.

According to epidemiological studies of NPP workers, conducted by a public-interest, incorporated foundation called the Radiation Effects Association, and other groups, 34 such workers lost their lives due leukemia with their accumulated exposure dose at 10mSv or more between 1990 and 2009. More than 60 other workers passed away due to stomach, lung, or other cancer after accumulated exposure of 100mSv or more,.

As of the end of August 2015, more than 20,000 people had accumulated exposure of 5mSv or more working at Fukushima Daiichi after its disaster. This number will keep rising. To win worker’s compensation certification, a worker is required to know his/her exposure dose, health state, etc. Such information, however, is often not available to many workers. Furthermore, the application procedure for the certification is not easy.

Moreover, there is currently no legal framework for providing compensation to any common resident who has been exposed to radiation, even if he/she has developed cancer and pays for his/her own medical expenses and takes leave from work. A survey of some 460,000 residents of Fukushima Prefecture estimated that some 950 residents, excluding NPP workers, had an exposure dose of 5mSv or more during the four months following the Fukushima Daiichi disaster.

Dr. Saburo Murata, vice director of Hannan Chuo Hospital, is an expert in radiation exposure control for NPP workers. Says the doctor, “Those workers take some measures to protect themselves from radiation, though such measures are mostly insufficient. Their exposure doses are measured. On the other hand, common residents are exposed to radiation without any protective measures, and their doses are not controlled. There should be a legal framework to grant them compensation for leave from work and treatment for lower doses of exposure than those of NPP workers.”

For residents in Fukushima, much of their anxieties concerning radiation are about their future health. The Japanese government must establish a legal framework to provide compensation for health hazards from radiation, regardless of whether the victims are NPP workers or common residents. Otherwise, the government would be acting irresponsibly in restarting existing NPPs.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Sources: article of October 9^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper, and those of October 9^th and 14^th editions of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper)

▼Click each image to enlarge it and read the caption.

Ms. Svetlana Alexievich (67), a Belarussian writer and journalist, has been chosen as the 2015 Nobel Laureate in Literature. She is famous for both “Chernobyl Prayer,” a non-fiction work that presents the stories of witnesses to the Chernobyl disaster, and for other works.

She has held numerous interviews with those victimized by wars, the Chernobyl accident, and by other tragedies, and has presented their stories in her written works. Resisting pressures from the national government, Alexievich has consistently reported the truth of the victims to society.

Her renowned work, “Chernobyl Prayer,” was first published in 1997, and was then translated into many languages, including Japanese. The work has won numerous international awards. Still, the Belarussian president rebuked the work and temporarily suspended its publication within the country.

Says Ms. Svetlana Alexievich, “A state is dedicated to protecting its own interests and power and just lets people disappear into oblivion with time. This makes it all the more important to record the memories of individuals.”

Mr. Ryoichi Wago, a poet resident in Fukushima City, says, “I have interviewed many residents of Fukushima and written down what they say since the earthquake and tsunami disaster of 2011. To me, the choice of Ms. Alexievich as a Nobel Laureate is a great encouragement. In this age of drastic turmoil, her winning the Prize has demonstrated that the world now badly wants documentary work like hers. The truth of Chernobyl and that of Fukushima overlap each other a lot. As rebuilding is in progress in devastated Tohoku, I do feel a silent voice saying, ‘Why do you still talk about experiences of the devastation,’ yet I am now convinced that I should not hesitate to spread the truth. Ms. Alexievich has reminded me that I must spread the truth.”

I (the author) too read “Chernobyl Prayer” and I found it hard to turn the pages—the voices recorded in that book are so vivid and so many of them are similar to the voices heard here in Fukushima. I have been deeply moved by those voices. The book also convinced me that the radiation hazards created by the Chernobyl disaster have no end, which suggests the future of Fukushima as well. What grief!

Now, four years after the 2011 disaster, I find my feelings about radiation changing every single day. Looking back, shortly after the tsunami and earthquake, I was seriously afraid of radiation. Now, I often seem to be insensitive to it. Right after the disaster, we heard a confusing diversity of information about radiation and I did not know what to believe. All I could do was to avoid exposure to radiation as far as I could. Today, my worries are about the future health of citizens here and the discrimination they might face.

I certainly hope a disaster like Fukushima Daiichi meltdown will never happen again. To prevent another tragedy, I do believe that it is crucial to collect and record the voices of the ordinary citizens of Fukushima.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Source: article of October 9^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper)

▼Click the image to enlarge it and read the caption.

This questionnaire survey, targeted at Fukushima parents with an infant/infants who were examined for internal exposure to radiation from TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), found major differences in the rate those parent use both agricultural products produced within the prefecture and the local tap water.

Among those municipalities with a large number of parents who were examined for internal exposure, in Miharu-machi, only 4% of the respondents said that they avoided the use of rice and vegetables produced in Fukushima Prefecture, as well as local tap water. Meanwhile, in Minamisoma and Soma, the avoidance rate reached 57% and 65%, respectively. Mr. Masaharu Tsubokura, a special-mission researcher at the Institute of Medical Science, the University of Tokyo, described his opinion, saying, “Many of those parents living in the municipalities close to Fukushima Daiichi are still worried over their food and water.”

In Koriyama, another municipality in Fukushima, among the 208 parents that responded to the questionnaire, 106 (51%) said they avoided the use of tap water, 89 (43%) said they avoided rice produced in Fukushima, 96 (46%) said they avoided vegetables produced in the prefecture, and 47 (23%) replied that they avoided all of rice and vegetables produced in Fukushima as well as local tap water.

I (the author) live in Koriyama, where local grocery stores sell vegetables produced in Fukushima at lower prices than vegetables from elsewhere. Still, few buy Fukushima vegetables, many of which remain unsold.

A certain mother of a child, living in Koriyama, says she has never used fresh foods produced in Fukushima or local tap water for cooking or drinking since the NPP disaster.

For the last decade, I have heard that, in the contaminated forest around Chernobyl, many tree leaves have been turning into leaf soil, which is easily absorbed by plants. Today, in that forest, the highest level of radioactivity has been detected at 5 to 10cm (2” to 4”) below the soil’s surface. Furthermore, radioactivity inside wood from the forest has recently been rapidly on the rise, according to Mr. Masaharu Kawada, a molecular biologist involved in rescue work for Chernobyl refugees. In other words, the radioactivity of food and drink does not necessarily diminish as time goes by.

The Fukushima Daiichi meltdown drastically changed what it means to raise a child in Fukushima. Without sufficient, trustable information available on food safety, parents have been raising their children with serious stress and anxiety. Their fear of internal exposure to radiation, caused by contaminated food and drink, will never leave them. In addition to direct damage to health from internal radiation, the serious mental stress experienced by parents can adversely affect their children as well. For many years to come, those parents simply have to live with such fears and anxieties.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Source: article of October 5^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper)
▼Click the image to enlarge it and read the caption.

The decommissioning work, currently in progress, of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) has been producing huge amounts of debris and other waste. Now, such waste is expected to exceed the full storage capacity on the NPP’s premises in March 2017. TEPCO is thus facing an urgent task. As of the end of August 2015, the storage capacity is already half full.

The premises accommodate numerous tanks containing contaminated water. It is hard to secure space for more storage and incinerators that burn waste to reduce its volume.

There is no legal restriction to removing waste containing radioactive substances from the premises. TEPCO is considering removing it and then reusing it as building materials. At the same time, however, the power company is aware that many building subcontractors and general citizens are reluctant to reuse waste from a NPP accident. Thus, according to the company, “Currently, the best way is to store such waste on the NPP’s premises.”

Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority is expected to set up a new committee dedicated to this issue, which should begin discussions on what to do with such waste. The Authority’s preferred choice currently is to reuse the waste as building materials.

Many countries in Europe and North America are ahead of Japan in the “age of decommissioning,” and they have already chosen sites for burying low-level radioactive waste. The burying of such waste is already in progress.

According to sources from the prefectural government of Fukui and others, the US, by August 2014, had decided to decommission 27 of its 127 NPP reactors. Of these 27, the decommissioning of 10 is already completed. The low-level radioactive waste from this decommissioning is buried in four vast disposal sites established in states like Utah and Texas, etc.

A world leader in “going nuke-free,” Germany, has decided to decommission 23 of its 32 NPP reactors, almost 70%. Nine of them are currently in operation, and they too are to terminate their operation by 2022. This means that the nation will produce huge amounts of radioactive waste in and shortly after 2022. The German government is responsible for what to do with such waste and has been building disposal sites. This is  a major difference from Japan, where the power companies are responsible for disposing waste from their NPPs.

Final disposal sites for radioactive waste pose another problem. At this moment, of all the countries of the world, only Sweden and Finland have chosen such sites. A public relations person from Sweden’s Swedish Nuclear Fuel and Waste Management Company (SKB) says, “It took 30 years of research before we chose the final site.” The company surveyed everywhere within Sweden and considered every possible scenario, from an earthquake to the next ice age, according to Deutsche Welle, an international broadcast service of Germany.

As Japan faces the age of decommissioning many of its existing NPPs, we already see a limit to what power companies can do with respect to nuclear waste disposal sites. I believe the national government will have to take the initiative. In that case, however, I am worried that rural regions will be sacrificed again as disposal sites. For example, Fukushima was producing power consumed by Tokyo, until recently.

Also, the Japanese government set up “clearance levels,” allowing some very low-level radioactive waste to be treated as general waste, not “radioactive.” This means such radioactive waste can be reused and find its way into our everyday lives. No one is certain as to what such reuse will do to us. (For your reference, please visit http://www.chernobyl-chubu-jp.org/_userdata/kawata42.pdf part of a Japanese website containing writings by Mr. Masaharu Kawada, a molecular biologist helping Chernobyl refugees.

Capitalist economy, addicted to the pursuit of wealth, has its dark side, such as NPPs. If our future generations have to pay “the price” for NPPs, what kind of a world will it be? We have to keep the Fukushima Daiichi disaster in mind and be aware that it is time for us to change our value system.