Category Archives: Quotes from Papers

Three decades after the Chernobyl, and the decommissioning still has a long way to go.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Article from the March 25th, 2016 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper2016年3月25日朝日

This April marks the 30th year since one of worst nuclear power plant (NPP) accidents in history hit the Chernobyl NPP, in Ukraine. On March 23rd, 2016, the “new shelter” (new safe confinement), currently under construction, was shown to the press.

The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), which is financing the new confinement construction, showed it to media people from many nations. The new “shelter” is expected to contain radiation for 100 years to come. Still, no one knows when the decommissioning work, including dismantling of the sarcophagus, will be done. There also are worries over how to finance ongoing maintenance and control.

Thirty years since one of the worst NPP disasters ever, at Chernobyl, the “new shelter,” now in construction, was shown to the press.

A gigantic arch standing over —
Unit 4 of the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station (NPP) exploded on April 26th, 1986, during a test run. The explosion caused fires at the plant. During the 10 days that followed, the NPP released almost six times more radioactive substances than did TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi meltdown. The firefighting that followed the Chernobyl disaster killed more than 30 firefighters. The NPP’s surroundings are a no-go zone, even today.

Unit 4 was then sealed with a sarcophagus. The sarcophagus, however, has aged and some decay and structural collapses are presently visible in some of the walls and roof; this can result in radiation leakage. Therefore, the “new shelter”, a gigantic arch in shape, is supposed to cover the entire sarcophagus in order to contain radioactive substances. By the end of this year, the plan goes, the new confinement structure should be moved above the sarcophagus via a railway. Then, at long last, the reactor decommissioning work can begin.

A millennium to go
The new confinement, whose construction began in 2012, is estimated to cost some 1.5 billion euro. It is designed to withstand earthquakes and tornados, and to contain radioactive substances for a century to come. The specifics of the decommissioning, however, such as how to break down the sarcophagus, have yet to be determined. Another headache is how to finance the maintenance of such a gigantic structure. Moreover, the radioactive substances inside the sarcophagus, judging from their half-lives, will remain a serious threat for at least another millennium, which means they will have to build a new confinement structure at least ten times.

Thus, the decommissioning is a long and winding way, extending way far beyond the horizon.


 

40 years? Really??
Meanwhile, some people say decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi will take four decades or so. Is that really possible?

Mr. Hiroaki Koide, formerly an associate professor at Kyoto University’s Research Reactor Institute, says, “The most crucial issue is to how to collect the melted down nuclear fuel. Currently, we have yet to find out the condition of the fuel since neither a human nor a robot can get close to it. Probably, the only ultimate solution will be to confine the fuel under a sarcophagus.” (quoted from the Chunichi Shimbun, December 9th, 2015)

Also, how much time, money, and how many workers will be necessary before the decommissioning is done? God alone knows.

No-human lands?
Now’ Japan’s government is lifting the evacuation orders on more municipalities around Fukushima Daiichi. Yet most of those “returning home” are elderly people. Few young ones are going home. Many are concerned, therefore, that when the decommissioning is done at long last, the surrounding areas could turn out to be empty places with no inhabitants.

The Japanese author’s concerns and wish
I am a resident in (a less contaminated area of) Fukushima. Ever since March, 2011, I have witnessed, with my own eyes and ears, how much harm radiation does.

The meltdown and its aftermath are still right here. I hope more readers will become serious about these issues. Also, I hope more people will visit Fukushima and see what is happening here.

 

 

“Another disaster like Fukushima Daiichi will hit again,” said 60% of researchers of earthquakes and volcanoes.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Below: Article from the March 20th, 2016 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper2016年3月20日民報

Experts’ opinion
Kyodo News conducted a survey with researchers in the fields of seismology and volcanology, and they discovered that almost 90% of the respondents thought Japan’s national disaster countermeasures “have not changed substantially” since the March 2011 earthquake. According to those respondents, the nation has yet to learn the lessons from the 2011 devastations.

More than 60% say it can happen again
Taking advantage of this fifth annual commemoration of the East Japan Earthquake, the questionnaire was sent to 120 researchers in the areas of seismology, active faults, and/or volcanology. Only 27 researchers responded. More than 60% of the respondents (18) said that we could have another “nuclear-earthquake complex disaster,” which is to say that a devastative complex disaster including an earthquake, tsunami, and a nuclear reactor accident could happen again someday. Also, 26 of the respondents (96%) replied that an earthquake or another disaster that far exceeds our assumptions “will happen again someday.” Some of the respondent admitted that researchers can make wrong judgments. Some respondents thought that researchers should be more involved in the general society.


 

The Japanese author’s concerns
Another thing worrying me about this survey is the low response rate—only 20%. The remaining 80% who received the survey did not respond—why? These researchers are expected to make scientific contributions to disaster prevention. If they avoid commenting on issues related to nuclear power, it is a serious problem.

Many people most likely think of the tragedies of Chernobyl and Fukushima Daiichi when they hear about “nuclear power plant accidents.” The plain fact, however, is that globally many such accidents have taken place so far, and Japan is no exception. In September 1999, at JCO’s nuclear fuel plant in Tokai Village, Ibaraki (some 60 miles NE of central Tokyo), a “criticality accident,” something theoretically impossible, did happen and killed two employees. In August 2004, the secondary piping fractured—an accident that could have been easily prevented—at Unit 3 of Kansai Electric Power’s Mihama Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), killing five subcontract workers. Moreover, criticality incidents have hit the Shika NPP and Fukushima Daiichi in the past, yet were covered up. Thus, NPP accidents are actually quite frequent. This is a plain fact that citizens should be well aware of.

32,000 workers at Fukushima Daiichi exposed to 5 mSv or more of radiation annually

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Articles from the March 7th, 2016 editions of the Fukushima Minpo and Akahata newspapers and from the March 9th edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper)

Fukushima Daiichi workers facing fatal risks
Of the workers counteracting the meltdown at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi, a total of more than 32,000 have been exposed to 5 mSv or more of radiation, as of the end of January 2016, according to a recent finding. 5 mSv is the criterion set up by Japan’s Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare for registering a worker as a victim of work-related leukemia. Anyone can tell that those workers will be exposed to even more radiation in the months to come than workers at other nuclear power plants, since they have highly dangerous jobs to do, such as inspecting the reactors’ insides, carrying used nuclear fuels out of the storage pools, etc. Since 2012, employees of TEPCO’s subsidiaries and subcontractors have been exposed to more radiation than TEPCO’s own employees have. And this gap has been ever expanding.

 

“Deadly dangerous — you go first”
Yet another fact discovered is that those non-TEPCO workers, who come to Fukushima Daiichi from TEPCO’s subcontractors and subsidiaries, have been exposed to radiation almost 4 times greater than the overall average exposure. Since almost 90% of all the workers are from outside TEPCO, their total exposure dose together reached some 30 times above the average. This is obvious evidence that the power company pushes more dangerous jobs to non-TEPCO workers.

 

Needed yet mistreated
Ever since Fukushima Daiichi began to melt down, countless workers have come and gone. Especially, in those areas with high radiation, many workers reach their legal limit of accumulative exposure in only three months of work or so and leave the nuclear power plant (NPP). Furthermore, those workers, exposed to all the dangers, are not receiving compensation worthy of their risks. On the average, they receive only JPY 200,000 or so, which is below what some of the decontamination workers outside the NPP receive. Thus, many NPP workers are voicing their dissatisfaction. Now, experts say that decommissioning Fukushima Daiichi will take four decades or so. Where can a sufficient workforce come from to handle 40 years of highly dangerous work?

 

In conclusion
Fukushima Daiichi is currently cooled and quiet, but only because workers there are risking their health and lives to keep it cooled. All of us must show our gratitude and respect to them.

At the same time, the Japanese government should establish a decent compensation system for all those workers who risk their own health to save the rest of us. Such a compensation system should cover the years following those workers’ retirements as well.

Operations of Takahama Nuclear Power Plant’s Units 3 and 4 suspended by a provisional ruling – for the first time with an in-operation NPP in Japan

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Articles from the March 10th, 2016 editions of the Asahi Shimbun, Fukushima Minpo, and Akahata newspapers

Sorry, no English summary of the Japanese articles is available.

The court’s ruling
29 residents of Shiga Prefecture, right next to Fukui Prefecture where Kansai Electric Power’s Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) is located, filed an appeal at the Ohtsu District Court to suspend the operation of Units 3 and 4 of the NPP which were restarted in January and February of this year. The chief judge, Yoshihiko Yamamoto, gave a provisional ruling, suspending the two units’ operations. The judge brought up questions concerning the NPP’s countermeasures to protect against earthquakes and tsunami. He also questioned the escape plans for residents in the NPP’s vicinity, pointing out that the causes of the Fukushima Daiichi meltdown have yet to be identified. He judged that Kansai Electric’s proof of the NPP’s safety is insufficient.

 

The result
The ruling took effect immediately. Of the two units in question, Unit 4 was already out of operation due to a technical problem. Thus, Kansai Electric has to stop the operation of Unit 3 on March 10th. At the same time, the power company plans to file an objection to the ruling and request a stay of execution at the same court. Unless this objection and/or the request are admitted, the court’s ruling to suspend the two units’ operations will remain legally valid.

 

Responsibility of the operator
The court’s ruling holds that the operator of a NPP has the responsibility to prove its safety, since the operator possesses the relevant data. If the operator is unable to give sufficient proof of safety, one can justly suppose that the operator’s judgments may be faulty.

 

The judge said —
The judge also pointed out that, considering how serious the meltdown of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi has been, a major NPP accident can cause environmental disasters whose affects go beyond national borders. This can more than offset any energy efficiency a NPP might produce. Thus, according to the judge, NPP safety standards should be strict enough to prevent an accident, even if some safety measures are considered extreme. The judge went on to say that the starting point of future safety standards, i.e., the causes of Fukushima Daiichi’s meltdown, “have yet to be identified.” In spite of this, the Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has set up new safety standards for NPPs. The judge said that he was “seriously worried” about the NRA’s attitude and “reluctant to believe that the NRA’s new safety standards and examinations are good enough to secure the peace and safety of society.”

 

Safety measures declared insufficient
Then, the judge described the court’s decision with respect to the severe accident prevention measures at the Takahama NPP. As a power company designs earthquake-proof buildings, it assumes standard earthquake motions. With respect to such motions, the judge decided that the active fault lengths that Kansai Electric Power assumed were inaccurate. This inaccuracy led to insufficient earthquake-proof designs, according to the judge. He also brought up, as a piece of evidence throwing doubt on the sufficiency of Kansai Electric’s countermeasures, literature reporting on the Tensho Earthquake of 1586, which caused devastation from a tsunami to the Wakasa Region, which includes Takahama, The judge went on to say that, even under the new safety standards, the cooling systems of water pools storing used nuclear fuel are more vulnerable to earthquakes than reactors are. Thus, the judge claimed, Kansai Electric did not have good countermeasures to protect against damage to such a pool which could lead to the leakage of cooling water.

 

A brave judge
The judge also brought up the escape plans prepared by the municipalities around the Takahama NPP and said that, “We have an urgent need to prepare specific escape plans under the initiative of the national government.” He also said, “We need a more comprehensive regulatory standard that covers such new escape plans as well. Japan’s national government today has the obligation, under the principle of faith and trust, to define such a new standard.” Thus he criticized the national government, which has been promoting NPP restarts under the existing safety regulations – something unusual for a court judge to do.

 

Right to live in peace
The plaintiffs in this court case, who live within 30 to 70 km (19 to 44 miles) of the Takahama NPP, claimed that a serious accident at the NPP would violate their personal right to live in peace and with good health. The court ruling agreed that such a violation would be highly probable in the case of a serious accident.

 

Takahama’s own weakness
As you know, at Fukushima Daiichi, they cooled down the reactor cores with a gigantic volume of water, and stored the contaminated water in tanks within the NPP’s premises. In contrast, Takahama has very limited premises, which cannot accommodate many huge water tanks. In the case of a meltdown or another serious accident, how can they take countermeasures given the limited premises? To aggravate the matter, there are not many escape routes available to the residents around Takahama. If a major earthquake hits, rescue vehicles would experience difficulties reaching their destinations.

 

The Japanese author’s wish
Now, five years after the meltdown began at Fukushima Daiichi, the Ohtsu District Court’s ruling precisely pointed out deficiencies in existing safety measures of NPPs. We must not let another Fukushima tragedy happen. I am convinced, therefore, that the NRA and the power companies have to face the problems pointed out by the court and respond with integrity.

Active fault located right below the Shika Nuclear Power Plant – Unit 1 probably to be decommissioned

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Articles from the March 4th, 2016 editions of the Asahi Shimbun, Fukushima Minpo, and Akahata newspapers

▼Click each image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

Faulty faults
Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority’s Survey Team of Experts has concluded that “the geological fault right under Unit 1 of Hokuriku Electric Power’s Shika Nuclear Power Plan (NPP) should rationally be considered as an active fault.” Last summer, the team’s draft decision said that the possibility of it being active could not be ruled out. Thus, the team’s final decision has been made.

In the coming months, the Authority’s examination meetings should discuss the decommissioning of Shika’s Unit 1. The Survey Team’s decision is to be treated as “an important expert opinion” and, unless Hokuriku Electric Power disproves it with sufficient new data, Unit 1 should be decommissioned.

Right below the NPP —
Especially problematic are three geological faults on the premises. Fault S-1, which runs right under Unit 1, has finally been determined to be an “active fault that can possibly move the ground.” As for the other two, named S-2 and S-6, which run right under the turbine buildings of Units 1 and 2, the Team determined that “though their gaps do not reach the surface, there is a possibility that they were active some 120,000 to 13,000 years ago.”

And faulty examinations
The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has been examining the sites of six NPPs, which its predecessor, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, asked it to continue, with expert examination of the active faults existing on the NPP premises. The NRA pointed out that one or more active faults could exist on the premises of Shika’s Units 1 and 2, Unit 2 of The Japan Atomic Power Company’s Tsuruga NPP, and Unit 1 of Tohoku Electric Power’s Higashidori NPP. These problems should have been discovered before those NPPs were built. We can naturally assume that the pre-construction examinations were faulty.

The safety examinations of Shika’s Unit 1 were conducted in 1987 and 1988, by the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the former Nuclear Safety Commission. Hokuriku Electric Power then conducted its own additional examination for geological faults. The Survey Team used drawings prepared by that additional examination to detect active faults. Some sections of the survey showed a suspicion of active faults. This suspicion, however, seems to have been ignored. We can therefore question whether or not the safety examinations were conducted fairly and correctly. It is noteworthy that the former Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency remained reluctant to verify the safety examination results.

~Comment by Dr. Kazuya Kodama, secretary general of “Genpatsu Mondai Jumin Undo Ishikawa-ken Renraku Center (Ishikawa Prefecture Communications Center, Citizens’ Anti-Nuke Movements)”~

This conclusion explicitly states that the faults in question can be active, and describes the Survey Team’s examination in detail. Hokuriku Electric cannot disprove the possibility of active faults, even if it provides more data. The power company has no other choice but to accept the conclusion and decommission its Shika NPP.

The conclusion declared Unit 1 to be inoperable since it has an active fault right below it. Unit 2 has active faults as well, running below its turbine building and the piping that collects cooling water, two important facilities. Repairing them to restart the unit would be a waste of money. Instead, Hokuriku Electric would better spend its money and technologies on the development and spread of natural energies.

Hokuriku Electric is advised to go nuclear-free, becoming the first company to do so among Japan’s nine power companies with a NPP. That is the wisest choice. I am determined to let the citizens of Ishikawa know the Survey Team’s conclusion in order to accelerate their call for NPP decommissioning.

The Japanese author’s wish
Units 1 and 2 of the Shika NPP have been out of operation since shortly before the meltdown of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi. So far, however, Hokuriku Electric has experienced no major problem in supplying power. Also, the company owns huge hydraulic power plants. Therefore, spending more money on the Shika NPP, whose restart is now very questionable, would be nothing but a waste of money.

I also hope the NRA will make correct and fair decisions based on scientific knowledge. If it allows a restart that ignores an active fault on the very premises of the NPP, the safety regulations of NPPs will be rendered meaningless.

Shika NPP

This NPP was built by Hokuriku Electric Power in the town of Shika, Ishikawa Pref. (160 miles north of Nagoya), on the Noto Peninsula facing the Japan Sea. The NPP accommodates two boiling water reactors (BWRs), the type of reactors also employed in Fukushima Daiichi. Unit 1’s operation began in 1993, with an output of 540,000 kW, followed by Unit 2 in 2006, whose output was 1,358,000 kW. In 1999, Unit 1 experienced a critical accident caused by an operational error. The power company concealed it until 2007, when the accident was discovered. Even after that, at Unit 1 some accidents involving the control rods occurred. The whole NPP has been out of operation since a regular checkup in March 2011. This plant’s premises are surrounded by many active faults. One of them, named “Fukura Fault,” is around 1 km (0.6 mile) away from the NPP. The power company refused to admit that Fukura is active, until 2013.

The nuclear fuel cycle found to make no economic sense

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Article from the February 28th, 2016 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper

▼Click the image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

The power companies do not disclose the cost of “uranium oxide fuel” (as distinct from mixed oxides [MOX]) either, yet the same calculation described above obtains an average uranium fuel cost of JPY 118.73 million in July, 1998. The average price slightly diminished to JPY 102.59 million in October, 2013. The MOX imported in June of the same year carried a price tag almost 9 times larger.

MOX as a luxury
Japan’s Ministry of Finance’s trade statistics and some other sources have shown that a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel of plutonium and uranium, made by reprocessing used uranium fuel, is almost nine times pricier than a uranium-only fuel. Kansai Electric Power recently restarted Units 3 and 4 of its Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (located in Fukui, Japan, some 45 miles NNW of Kyoto), using MOX fuel. Takahama’s MOX fuel cost some JPY 900 million apiece.

 

Makes no economic sense
Japan’s government is insistent on its nuclear fuel cycle policy, which reuses plutonium extracted from used uranium fuel. One major reason for this is to stop the buildup of plutonium generated in reactors. Japan possesses some 47.8 ton (105,381 lb.) of plutonium, which can be used to build nuclear weapons. The nation’s nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities are underdeveloped, however, and now it has become evident that nuclear fuel recycling makes no economic sense.

 

Broken scheme
No single MOX fuel consumes much plutonium, therefore, MOX production is not an efficient way to consume our abhorrent stock of plutonium. Also, pricey fuels certainly increase the power bills we pay. Prof. Ken’ichi Oshima of Ritsumeikan University, an expert in ecological economics, points out, “Recycling should bring down the cost. The plain fact with MOX fuels is just the opposite. They are a luxury and make no economic sense. In short, the Japanese government is insistent on a policy that is bankrupt both economically and technically. And the people will eventually have to pay for it.”

 

Doomed fuels
Originally, MOX fuel was meant for use in a fast breeder reactor (FBR). Yet the prototype FBR, Monju (also located in Fukui Pref.) has never run successfully long enough to make sense. Thus, the national government has switched to using MOX fuels in thermal (common) light water reactors. Japan’s major power companies estimate that using MOX fuels at 16 to 18 NPP reactors should consume some 6 tons (13,228 lb.) of plutonium each year. Still, the used nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and MOX fuel processing plant, located in Rokkasho, Aomori Pref. (some 406 miles NNE of Tokyo) are way behind schedule and have yet to operate. To aggravate the issue, the fuel processing plant is incapable of processing used MOX fuel. Thus, no one knows what to do with such used fuel.

 

Recycling plutonium – and wasting money
The Japan Atomic Energy Commission of Japan’s Cabinet Office, in 2012, announced an estimated cost for the nation’s nuclear fuel recycling. It admitted that the “once through” system, which buries used nuclear fuels without reprocessing them, costs less money than does recycling used fuel’s plutonium, regardless of the ratio of nuclear power in the future power source portfolio.


 

Article from the March 3rd, 2016 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper
▼Click the image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

Asahi Shimbun The origin of Japan’s MOX planning dates back to 2000, when the US and Russia signed a nuclear arms reduction agreement in response to the end of the Cold War. The two nations dismantled many nuclear weapons, whose plutonium was to be made into MOX fuel for consumption in light water and fast breeder reactors. Though the US began building a reprocessing plant in 2007, the MOX plan has been on the rocks. An alternative, “watering down to dispose,” mixes plutonium with some other substances to inhibit the extraction of plutonium, and then buries the waste in New Mexico’s nuclear waste disposal facility, some 656m (728 yards) below the ground. US Secretary of Energy, Moniz, endorses this burial plan, saying, “It’s not too late to choose this alternative. Beginning now, we can do this with less than half of the cost necessary with the MOX plant plan. And this burial certainly requires less technical challenges.” Transportation of the plutonium mix can begin in the early 2020s, 15 years before the MOX plant will be ready, according to the Secretary.
Asahi Shimbun
The origin of Japan’s MOX planning dates back to 2000, when the US and Russia signed a nuclear arms reduction agreement in response to the end of the Cold War. The two nations dismantled many nuclear weapons, whose plutonium was to be made into MOX fuel for consumption in light water and fast breeder reactors. Though the US began building a reprocessing plant in 2007, the MOX plan has been on the rocks. An alternative, “watering down to dispose,” mixes plutonium with some other substances to inhibit the extraction of plutonium, and then buries the waste in New Mexico’s nuclear waste disposal facility, some 656m (728 yards) below the ground. US Secretary of Energy, Moniz, endorses this burial plan, saying, “It’s not too late to choose this alternative. Beginning now, we can do this with less than half of the cost necessary with the MOX plant plan. And this burial certainly requires less technical challenges.” Transportation of the plutonium mix can begin in the early 2020s, 15 years before the MOX plant will be ready, according to the Secretary.

Burial in the US
The US government has decided to give up on the building of the MOX fuel plant, which had been underway in South Carolina. Though the plan originally meant to use plutonium collected from discarded nuclear weapons in power generation, the plan costs some USD 40 billion, which is a terrible economic burden. As an alternative, the government is now considering a “water down and bury” disposal plan, which first mixes plutonium with some other substances and then buries the mixture.

And in the UK too?
The tough issues the US experienced shows that plutonium is too expensive for any commercial use. The US government’s decision to bury plutonium underground for cost savings should affect the rest of the world. The UK, which possesses some 100 tons (220,462 lb.) of plutonium, is actually considering such burial as well, though it claims to be using the plutonium in MOX fuels.

 

Hanging on to the dead —
Thus, the world stands at the threshold of an “age of burying plutonium.” Japan, running against the trend, is trying to build a reprocessing plant to use plutonium. The nation already has almost 50 tons (110,231 lb.) of the deadly element, while its FBR (fast breeder reactor) dream has already proven to be nothing but a fancy. What we really need to do now is to look straight at the fact that the planned nuclear fuel recycling makes no economic sense, and then reconsider the nation’s nuclear power policy.

Nowhere to pull out to?
One reason why Japan cannot pull out of the proposed nuclear fuel recycling is, once the recycling is given up, no NPP in the nation can work. Under the recycling plan, the used fuel, currently kept in water pools within NPPs, is treated as a “resource.” If recycling is abandoned, such fuel simply turns into “garbage.” Unless some new places for the disposal of used fuel are found, the water pools within NPPs would soon be full of such garbage. This disposal problem makes the government hold on to the fancy of “recycling all used nuclear fuel.”

Still, the plain fact, proven worldwide, is that such recycling is simply not feasible. Every citizen should be concerned with energy issues. The nation must find the right way to deal with existing nuclear fuel and reduce the risks and burdens accompanying such fuel.

5 years since the 2011 disaster, and mothers still agonized by anxieties and more

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Article from the February 23rd, 2016 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper

▼Click the image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

Asahi Shimbun Almost five years have passed since the meltdown began at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi. The natural decay of radioactive substances and the decontamination work have brought the radiation level down to some extent. The meltdown, however, is still seriously affecting the living and lifestyles of many people in Fukushima.
Asahi Shimbun
Almost five years have passed since the meltdown began at TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi. The natural decay of radioactive substances and the decontamination work have brought the radiation level down to some extent. The meltdown, however, is still seriously affecting the living and lifestyles of many people in Fukushima.

Almost five years have passed —
Today, here in Fukushima, we see more parents and children than before at supermarkets buying food produced in Fukushima. We see children’s clothing swinging and drying beside windows. (Hanging washed clothes to dry them is a common practice in Japan.) Still, some 70,000 people, by government order, are living as refugees. For many of them, life is simply not the same since the meltdown. Moreover, troubling issues experienced by the citizens of Fukushima never seem to be resolved.

A mother in agony
Such an issue that causes real agony for a 40-year-old mother, who moved with her husband and child into Koriyama from a coastal region of Fukushima shortly after the meltdown began, has to do with school lunches. Her 11-year-old daughter, a fifth grader, has to take her packed lunch out of her school bag, while some of her class mates serve other children the school provided meal (a common practice at many elementary schools in Japan). Even though the ingredients used in the meals provided by the schools, if they are produced in Fukushima, have passed radioactivity inspections, her mother is deeply worried over the daughter’s health and prepares a packed lunch for her every day.

Issues in the daughter’s class
The daughter has learned to eat the lunch prepared by her mother, saying “I don’t mind having a lunch different from that of my classmates sitting next to me.” Still, she knows that some of her classmates are whispering among themselves: “Is she emotionally sick, avoiding the school meal?” Her classmates used to be good friends, but they will not speak to her now. Says her mother, “Someday, my daughter might fall sick. I am overwhelmed by fear.”

One staffer at Fukushima Prefecture’s board of education has said, “Some, not many, school children carry their packed lunch to school. Some kids wear a mask when they run at a school athletic festival. Different people have different ideas about radiation, and we cannot push our beliefs onto them.”

 

Article from the February 21st, 2016 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper
▼Click the image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

Fukushima Minpo In the School Year 2015 (April 2015 through March 2016, in Japan), 27.3% of Fukushima’s school meal ingredients were produced in Fukushima, up from the year before by 5.4%. This is possibly a sign of food safety being restored, to some extent.
Fukushima Minpo
In the School Year 2015 (April 2015 through March 2016, in Japan), 27.3% of Fukushima’s school meal ingredients were produced in Fukushima, up from the year before by 5.4%. This is possibly a sign of food safety being restored, to some extent.

Worries still persist
As the chart in the article above shows, since shortly after the 2011 disaster, school meals in Fukushima Prefecture have gradually been using more farm products from the prefecture. Still, a certain mother of an elementary student, resident in Koriyama, has never bought any food produced in Fukushima since the 2011 disaster. She is even hesitant with foods from northern Kanto (just south of Fukushima). Though she lets her child eat school meals, it is simply because she cannot find a practical alternative. Today, five years after the meltdown began, this mother is still worried over food safety. She said she is determined to avoid made-in-Fukushima foods.

She is not alone
Here in Fukushima, countless mothers are worried about radiation, with no one to talk to about their worries. One way or another, a mother’s anxiety will inevitably affect her family and children. Using ingredients from Fukushima can show the world that the prefecture is rebuilding, yet the worries of countless mothers must not be ignored.

Fukushima Minpo has reported on many other troubles caused by the meltdown. Some couples broke up when the mother and her children evacuated alone. Some mothers received compensation for damages suffered, while some of their neighbors did not. Naturally, those neighbors express their anger at those who received compensation.

Professor Sung Won-Cheol of Chukyo University and his fellows have continuously conducted a survey, targeted at mothers having a child between 1 and 2 years of age, since shortly after the meltdown began. The survey covers 9 municipalities in Fukushima Prefecture, including Fukushima City.

In the 2015 survey, almost a half of the respondents, some 1,200 in number, said they were worried over their children (living in Fukushima). Some 30% of the respondents replied with either “Applies” or “Somehow applies” to the question, “Do you avoid foods produced in Fukushima Prefecture?” This ratio shows a sharp decline from the more than 80% who responded that way half a year after the 2011 disaster. About governmental compensation for damages, more than 70% replied that they have experienced some unfairness. Says Prof. Sung, “Everyone has his/her own response to radiation anxieties, and it is hard to counteract. There should at least be some measures to prevent the complaints of some victims from turning into insults directed at those who have received compensation.”

 

The Japanese author’s wish
Childhood experiences play a crucial role in the development of a child’s mind. In Fukushima and vicinity, radiation is badly affecting the childhoods of many children. Before it is too late, we need to restore an environment wherein parents can take care of their kids in peace.

 

 

 

 

Fukushima Daiichi’s “ice walls” are there, but the water-blocking walls are blocked from use

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Articles from the February 10th, 2016 editions of the Fukushima Minpo, Asahi Shimbun, and Akahata newspapers

▼Click each image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

In its struggle to contain the contaminated water from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), TEPCO has resorted to building “ice walls*.” Presently, the walls are there, and yet the power company cannot start the final “freezing” of the walls. Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) refuses to give the wall freezing a go-ahead, pointing out that rather than containing such water, as claimed by the power company, the water-shields could lead to further leakage of contaminated water. On February 9th, TEPCO announced the wall building work was done. Still, no one knows if the NRA will ever approve the walls for use.

(*) What are the “ice walls”?
At the Fukushima Daiichi NPP, under the reactor buildings where the melted nuclear fuel has fallen to the ground, underground water has been running into contact with the melted fuel, creating highly contaminated water. To counteract this, TEPCO announced a plan to surround the underground portions of reactors 1 through 4 with “ice walls,” 1,500m (0.93 mile) in total length. TEPCO installed numerous freezer pipes, 1,568 in number, 30m (33 yards) below the ground surface, with two pipes 1m (1.1 yard) apart from each other. The plan is to circulate a liquid coolant, 30C below the freezing point (22F below zero), through those pipes to freeze the soil surrounding the pipes. There is no precedence for such gigantic ice walls, however, and no evidence that the power company can maintain the frozen walls until 2020, as it claims to be able to do. Naturally, many are voicing their concerns over the ice wall plan. TEPCO is spending some JPY34.5 billion on the walls, which could well prove to be a huge extravagance.

What is wrong with the “ice walls”?
The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) of Japan must give approval to the walls, yet the NRA has been doubtful about their effectiveness since the very beginning. If the underground water level goes below the ice walls, some of the highly contaminated water from the reactor buildings could leak into the soil outside the walls.

The NRA’s committee to determine whether or not the walls can function safely has asked the power company, over and over again, why it insists on the ice walls among so many other options. The committee’s chairperson, Mr. Shunichi Tanaka, even went on to say, “TEPCO’s grave error is that it is spreading the false belief that the ice walls, once built, can eliminate the whole issue of contaminated water,” in the spring of 2015.

Can be serious —
In fact, TEPCO held a trial freezing of the walls in 2015, and discovered the underground water level was lower than expected in some places. The levels differed from one location to another, and much remains unknown about the water flow rates and directions. Those walls, once frozen, take 2 months or so to melt. Thus, in case a problem is detected, no quick fix exists.

TEPCO vs NRA
The Fukushima Daiichi premises now hold more than 700,000 t (1,543,234 lb.) of processed yet still contaminated water, and it is hard to build more water tanks to accommodate it. Thus, TEPCO is insistent upon cutting down the volume of new contaminated water, while the NRA is determined to prevent any leakage of such water. In-spite-of these differences, wall building work was almost completed in December 2015, when the NRA made an exceptional written “suggestion” to TEPCO that they should “partially freeze” the ice walls to reduce the risk of some contaminated water leaking out of the reactor buildings. Still, the power company is determined to completely freeze the entire walls, although it is considering the NRA’s “suggestion.”

Decommissioning the Monju Fast Breeder Reactor (FBR) could cost some JPY300 billion — the Japan Atomic Energy Agency estimated in 2012

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Articles from the February 16th, 2016 editions of the Fukushima Minpo and the February 17th editions of the Fukushima Minpo and Akahata newspapers

▼Click each image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

It has been learned that the Japan Atomic Energy Agency, the operator of the Monju FBR (Tsuruga, Fukui Pref., Japan, some 62 miles NNE of Kyoto), estimated that decommissioning the FBR could take some 30 years and some JPY300 billion.about  The Agency made the estimate in 2012, the year after the 2011 Fukushima meltdown. Said the Agency, “Back then there was a debate on whether or not to let Monju survive, so we made an internal estimate.”

Goliath can die, but —
This discovery, made public for the first time, about how much it could cost to decommission the FBR, makes clear that it will costeveral time more than decommissioning an average light water reactor. The non-operating breeder reactor has been a goliath money-eater, eating up more than JPY1 trillion with almost no power generated. Restarting it, instead of decommissioning it, could cost more than JPY100 billion for repairs, etc. Whether it is left alive or put to death, the goliath will remain a gigantic money-eater.

What is a FBR?
Monju is a fast breeder reactor, which runs on mixed oxide (MOX) fuel, a mixture of plutonium and uranium, and uses “fast” neutrons to cause nuclear fission. (Common light water reactors use slow neutrons.) A FBR generates more plutonium than it consumes for power generation, assuming there is power generation by the plant. Thus, it is called a “breeder.” Japan’s government, calling it the “dream reactor,” treated it as an indispensable component of the nation’s “nuclear fuel cycle,” which also requires a reprocessing plant for used nuclear fuels. Thus, the government has so far spent more than JPY1 trillion of tax money on FBR research and development. In spite of this megabuck spending, the FBR history has been a series of accidents and serious problems. Seldom has it produced any power. In 2012, it was discovered that an equipment checkup at Monju failed to cover many important items. The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA,) in May 2013, gave an in-effect stoppage order to the FBR.

So, why has this money-eater been around so far?
The question should be, in fact, why have they not been able to decommission it? Japan already has more than 47 t (103,617 lb.) of plutonium, which can be used to produce several thousands of plutonium warheads. International society allows Japan to have the plutonium, on condition that Japan uses all of it for peaceful purposes—power generation at Monju, etc. Decommissioning Monju would, therefore, cause many in the outside world to suspect that Japan is building nuclear weapons.

They need a “lavatory”
Yet another reason is that the Japanese government wants to build a “lavatory” for used nuclear fuels. A FBR was intended to recycle used nuclear fuels. Now, after all those never-ceasing accidents and problems, the “lavatory” has proven to be non-existent. Still, if the government gave up on this nuclear fuel cycle, it would mean, in effect, that it is admitting that there is no nuclear fuel “lavatory.” Not just the government, but reactor builders and power companies who want to restart existing nuclear power plants want to keep alive the myth that a “lavatory” can be built.

The Japanese author’s wish
Letting Monju survive is obviously just putting off till tomorrow what we should be taking care of today. Japan’s government should not waste any more tax money on this fruitless FBR project. I hope they have the courage to decommission Monju as soon as possible.

Waste from decontamination has nowhere to go — only 1% of the needed land acquired so far for intermediate storages

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Articles from the February 13th and 17th, 2016 editions of the Fukushima Minpo and the February 14th edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspapers

▼Click each image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

Much of the land desired for intermediate storage of radioactive waste from the meltdown of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP), surrounds the NPP. This land is in the “no return zones,” where radioactivity is high and citizens are not permitted to enter without special permission. The Fukushima Prefectural Government, and the municipal governments of Okuma and Futaba towns, decided to store radioactive waste from the decontamination work almost a year ago. Japan’s Ministry of the Environment has been carrying out a pilot (trial) transfer of some radioactive waste into temporary storage facilities built on such land. The transfer should end sometime in March 2016.

Sounds fine so far, but —
The land acquisition negotiations for intermediate storage sites are in the doldrums. Currently, therefore, no one knows how soon the building of such storage facilities can begin, or when the full transfer of radioactive waste can begin. So far, after all those difficult negotiations, less than 1% of the needed land has been acquired. Yes, such storage sites are indispensable as Fukushima tries to rebuild itself. Still, the Ministry has a serious shortage of negotiators, while many land owners are reluctant to “give up the lands their ancestors have left for them.”

Where can it go?
At the same time, the Fukushima Prefectural Government says the existing temporary storage facilities are almost full. While the complete transfer of radioactive waste into intermediate storage has yet to begin, the decontamination work is still in progress, creating more and more waste. The obvious result is that heaps of collected radioactive waste are piled up close to houses and offices that have been “decontaminated.”

Part of our everyday life
I am a resident in Koriyama, Fukushima, and every day I see piles of waste along the streets. At many houses, waste from the decontamination of the house is simply buried under the garden. True, the decontamination reduced the radioactivity of the house a bit, but it is creepy to know that some radioactive waste lies beneath the yard. Living here means that you will never be free from radioactivity.

Collected radioactive soil, packed in vinyl bags and then in concrete pipes, are lined up just outside an apartment house in the neighborhood of our Project’s office.
Collected radioactive soil, packed in vinyl bags and then in concrete pipes, are lined up just outside an apartment house in the neighborhood of our Project’s office.
Workers digging a hole in a house yard to bury radioactive waste from decontamination.
Workers digging a hole in a house yard to bury radioactive waste from decontamination.

The Japanese author’s wish

To rebuild Fukushima, we have to decide soon where all the radioactive waste will go. No future generation should have to live among heaps of radioactive waste. I do wish for intermediate storage for all the hazardous waste as soon as possible so that our children and their children can live in safety. Yet at the same time, many land owners are reluctant to sell their land for intermediate storage sites, knowing their own life stories are in the land. This issue has no easy solution.