Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Articles from the March 4^th, 2016 editions of the Asahi Shimbun, Fukushima Minpo, and Akahata newspapers

▼Click each image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

Faulty faults
Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority’s Survey Team of Experts has concluded that “the geological fault right under Unit 1 of Hokuriku Electric Power’s Shika Nuclear Power Plan (NPP) should rationally be considered as an active fault.” Last summer, the team’s draft decision said that the possibility of it being active could not be ruled out. Thus, the team’s final decision has been made.

In the coming months, the Authority’s examination meetings should discuss the decommissioning of Shika’s Unit 1. The Survey Team’s decision is to be treated as “an important expert opinion” and, unless Hokuriku Electric Power disproves it with sufficient new data, Unit 1 should be decommissioned.

Right below the NPP —
Especially problematic are three geological faults on the premises. Fault S-1, which runs right under Unit 1, has finally been determined to be an “active fault that can possibly move the ground.” As for the other two, named S-2 and S-6, which run right under the turbine buildings of Units 1 and 2, the Team determined that “though their gaps do not reach the surface, there is a possibility that they were active some 120,000 to 13,000 years ago.”

And faulty examinations
The Nuclear Regulation Authority (NRA) has been examining the sites of six NPPs, which its predecessor, the Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency of the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry, asked it to continue, with expert examination of the active faults existing on the NPP premises. The NRA pointed out that one or more active faults could exist on the premises of Shika’s Units 1 and 2, Unit 2 of The Japan Atomic Power Company’s Tsuruga NPP, and Unit 1 of Tohoku Electric Power’s Higashidori NPP. These problems should have been discovered before those NPPs were built. We can naturally assume that the pre-construction examinations were faulty.

The safety examinations of Shika’s Unit 1 were conducted in 1987 and 1988, by the former Ministry of International Trade and Industry and the former Nuclear Safety Commission. Hokuriku Electric Power then conducted its own additional examination for geological faults. The Survey Team used drawings prepared by that additional examination to detect active faults. Some sections of the survey showed a suspicion of active faults. This suspicion, however, seems to have been ignored. We can therefore question whether or not the safety examinations were conducted fairly and correctly. It is noteworthy that the former Nuclear and Industrial Safety Agency remained reluctant to verify the safety examination results.

～Comment by Dr. Kazuya Kodama, secretary general of “Genpatsu Mondai Jumin Undo Ishikawa-ken Renraku Center (Ishikawa Prefecture Communications Center, Citizens’ Anti-Nuke Movements)”～ This conclusion explicitly states that the faults in question can be active, and describes the Survey Team’s examination in detail. Hokuriku Electric cannot disprove the possibility of active faults, even if it provides more data. The power company has no other choice but to accept the conclusion and decommission its Shika NPP. The conclusion declared Unit 1 to be inoperable since it has an active fault right below it. Unit 2 has active faults as well, running below its turbine building and the piping that collects cooling water, two important facilities. Repairing them to restart the unit would be a waste of money. Instead, Hokuriku Electric would better spend its money and technologies on the development and spread of natural energies. Hokuriku Electric is advised to go nuclear-free, becoming the first company to do so among Japan’s nine power companies with a NPP. That is the wisest choice. I am determined to let the citizens of Ishikawa know the Survey Team’s conclusion in order to accelerate their call for NPP decommissioning.

The Japanese author’s wish
Units 1 and 2 of the Shika NPP have been out of operation since shortly before the meltdown of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi. So far, however, Hokuriku Electric has experienced no major problem in supplying power. Also, the company owns huge hydraulic power plants. Therefore, spending more money on the Shika NPP, whose restart is now very questionable, would be nothing but a waste of money.

I also hope the NRA will make correct and fair decisions based on scientific knowledge. If it allows a restart that ignores an active fault on the very premises of the NPP, the safety regulations of NPPs will be rendered meaningless.

Shika NPP This NPP was built by Hokuriku Electric Power in the town of Shika, Ishikawa Pref. (160 miles north of Nagoya), on the Noto Peninsula facing the Japan Sea. The NPP accommodates two boiling water reactors (BWRs), the type of reactors also employed in Fukushima Daiichi. Unit 1’s operation began in 1993, with an output of 540,000 kW, followed by Unit 2 in 2006, whose output was 1,358,000 kW. In 1999, Unit 1 experienced a critical accident caused by an operational error. The power company concealed it until 2007, when the accident was discovered. Even after that, at Unit 1 some accidents involving the control rods occurred. The whole NPP has been out of operation since a regular checkup in March 2011. This plant’s premises are surrounded by many active faults. One of them, named “Fukura Fault,” is around 1 km (0.6 mile) away from the NPP. The power company refused to admit that Fukura is active, until 2013.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below written and arranged by Heeday, based on the original Japanese
The English edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

Article from the February 28^th, 2016 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper

▼Click the image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

The power companies do not disclose the cost of “uranium oxide fuel” (as distinct from mixed oxides [MOX]) either, yet the same calculation described above obtains an average uranium fuel cost of JPY 118.73 million in July, 1998. The average price slightly diminished to JPY 102.59 million in October, 2013. The MOX imported in June of the same year carried a price tag almost 9 times larger.

MOX as a luxury
Japan’s Ministry of Finance’s trade statistics and some other sources have shown that a mixed oxide (MOX) fuel of plutonium and uranium, made by reprocessing used uranium fuel, is almost nine times pricier than a uranium-only fuel. Kansai Electric Power recently restarted Units 3 and 4 of its Takahama Nuclear Power Plant (located in Fukui, Japan, some 45 miles NNW of Kyoto), using MOX fuel. Takahama’s MOX fuel cost some JPY 900 million apiece.

 

Makes no economic sense
Japan’s government is insistent on its nuclear fuel cycle policy, which reuses plutonium extracted from used uranium fuel. One major reason for this is to stop the buildup of plutonium generated in reactors. Japan possesses some 47.8 ton (105,381 lb.) of plutonium, which can be used to build nuclear weapons. The nation’s nuclear fuel reprocessing facilities are underdeveloped, however, and now it has become evident that nuclear fuel recycling makes no economic sense.

 

Broken scheme
No single MOX fuel consumes much plutonium, therefore, MOX production is not an efficient way to consume our abhorrent stock of plutonium. Also, pricey fuels certainly increase the power bills we pay. Prof. Ken’ichi Oshima of Ritsumeikan University, an expert in ecological economics, points out, “Recycling should bring down the cost. The plain fact with MOX fuels is just the opposite. They are a luxury and make no economic sense. In short, the Japanese government is insistent on a policy that is bankrupt both economically and technically. And the people will eventually have to pay for it.”

 

Doomed fuels
Originally, MOX fuel was meant for use in a fast breeder reactor (FBR). Yet the prototype FBR, Monju (also located in Fukui Pref.) has never run successfully long enough to make sense. Thus, the national government has switched to using MOX fuels in thermal (common) light water reactors. Japan’s major power companies estimate that using MOX fuels at 16 to 18 NPP reactors should consume some 6 tons (13,228 lb.) of plutonium each year. Still, the used nuclear fuel reprocessing plant and MOX fuel processing plant, located in Rokkasho, Aomori Pref. (some 406 miles NNE of Tokyo) are way behind schedule and have yet to operate. To aggravate the issue, the fuel processing plant is incapable of processing used MOX fuel. Thus, no one knows what to do with such used fuel.

 

Recycling plutonium – and wasting money
The Japan Atomic Energy Commission of Japan’s Cabinet Office, in 2012, announced an estimated cost for the nation’s nuclear fuel recycling. It admitted that the “once through” system, which buries used nuclear fuels without reprocessing them, costs less money than does recycling used fuel’s plutonium, regardless of the ratio of nuclear power in the future power source portfolio.

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Article from the March 3^rd, 2016 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper
▼Click the image to read an English summary of the Japanese article.

Burial in the US
The US government has decided to give up on the building of the MOX fuel plant, which had been underway in South Carolina. Though the plan originally meant to use plutonium collected from discarded nuclear weapons in power generation, the plan costs some USD 40 billion, which is a terrible economic burden. As an alternative, the government is now considering a “water down and bury” disposal plan, which first mixes plutonium with some other substances and then buries the mixture.

And in the UK too?
The tough issues the US experienced shows that plutonium is too expensive for any commercial use. The US government’s decision to bury plutonium underground for cost savings should affect the rest of the world. The UK, which possesses some 100 tons (220,462 lb.) of plutonium, is actually considering such burial as well, though it claims to be using the plutonium in MOX fuels.

 

Hanging on to the dead —
Thus, the world stands at the threshold of an “age of burying plutonium.” Japan, running against the trend, is trying to build a reprocessing plant to use plutonium. The nation already has almost 50 tons (110,231 lb.) of the deadly element, while its FBR (fast breeder reactor) dream has already proven to be nothing but a fancy. What we really need to do now is to look straight at the fact that the planned nuclear fuel recycling makes no economic sense, and then reconsider the nation’s nuclear power policy.

Nowhere to pull out to?
One reason why Japan cannot pull out of the proposed nuclear fuel recycling is, once the recycling is given up, no NPP in the nation can work. Under the recycling plan, the used fuel, currently kept in water pools within NPPs, is treated as a “resource.” If recycling is abandoned, such fuel simply turns into “garbage.” Unless some new places for the disposal of used fuel are found, the water pools within NPPs would soon be full of such garbage. This disposal problem makes the government hold on to the fancy of “recycling all used nuclear fuel.”

Still, the plain fact, proven worldwide, is that such recycling is simply not feasible. Every citizen should be concerned with energy issues. The nation must find the right way to deal with existing nuclear fuel and reduce the risks and burdens accompanying such fuel.