Original Japanese written by staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the December 10^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushima Minpo newspaper and the December 11^th edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

TEPCO has discovered that the density of contaminated water stored within an underground tunnel known as a “duct” at its Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) has risen by some 4,000 to 4,100 times since a year before. The NPP houses some facilities called “waste processing buildings” around which there are underground tunnels known as “ducts.” They still store some 400 to 500 tons of contaminated water which originated both from sea water from the tsunami of March 2011, and from other sources. The power company collected some samples of this contaminated water and inspected them on December 3^rd, 2015 They detected 482,000 becquerel of radioactive cesium per liter (0.254 gallon) and some 500,000 becquerel of radioactive substances that emit the b ray. Compared to a previous inspection in December 2014, the contaminant concentration has, on the average, increased by some 4,000 to 4,100 times.
The “waste processing buildings” next to the duct in question temporarily store high-density contaminated water used to cool the melting down nuclear fuels.
TEPCO is trying to identify the cause of this drastic rise in the concentration of radioactive substances. One possibility is that the highly contaminated water in the waste processing building has leaked and run into the duct. Since the underground water around the duct shows no sign of a rise in the concentration of radioactive substances, the contaminated water has not leaked out of the duct, according to the power company.

Since there is no way that the density of radioactive substances “naturally” rise, one has every reason to suspect that there are some cracks somewhere in a joint of the processing building or a water stop through which high-density contaminated water runs. The power company has to identify the cause and resolve it as soon as it can. Otherwise, the water’s contamination density can keep skyrocketing.

Also, with almost five years passed since the March 2011 meltdown, the NPP’s waste storage buildings and tanks of contaminated water should deteriorate further with aging. At Fukushima Daiichi, the support columns of exhaust towers show rust and deformities, breaking at multiple places. Experts say they are in danger. The radioactive contamination around such a tower is as high as 25,000mSv/hr, which will kill you in only a dozen minutes or so. If any of the towers collapse now, more radioactive substances will be released. Urgent countermeasures are a must, according to the February 20, 2015 edition of the Akahata newspaper.

Meanwhile, at Chernobyl, “sealed up” Unit 4 is now posing a serious threat, 29 years after the disaster. The sarcophagus—the cement and steel structure that encases the destroyed reactor at the power station in Chernobyl—is aging and part of the walls and the roof are already beginning to collapse. This can lead to re-leakage of radioactive substances. Thus, they are building a structure that wraps the whole sarcophagus. The structure can last some 100 years, according to sources. Radioactive contamination, meanwhile, can last at least ten times that, judging from the half lives of many radioactive substances. This means they will need to re-build such a structure at least ten times.

The decommissioning of Fukushima Daiichi has been haunted by one problem after another, and such problems can grow even tougher in the years ahead. Is the decommissioning possible, at all? Currently no one knows the correct answer to this question.

NPPs carry such serious risks. I believe that more people need to know the truth about nuclear power. Once a person knows the truth, he/she can form their own ideas about nuclear power and then put them into practice. To make that happen, the Project on Nuclear Power and Radiation intends to spread what is happening here in Fukushima as factually as possible and in the easiest possible way to understand.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the December 9^th, 2015 edition of the Asahi Shimbun newspaper)
▼Click the image and read the caption.

Kansai Electric Power intends to extend the lives of Units 1 and 2 of the Takahama NPP, which are now more than 40 years old. The Nuclear Regulation Authority has been examining the case. One major issue there is fireproofing of the power cables, more than 1,000km (625 miles) in total length. Kansai Electric proposed to cover such cables with fireproof sheets, among other measures.
Japan’s new regulations on NPPs require fireproof cables. The two 40-year-old units in question, however, do not employ such cables. Kansai Electric, therefore, needs to take some measures to provide similar fireproofing. The power company applied to the Authority for permission to extend the two units’ lives by 20 years.
Kansai Electric has presented a plan both to cover some cables with fireproof sheets and to replace cables conducting high-voltage current with flame-resistant cables. An examination meeting of the Authority has approved most of such safety plans.
The two units at Takahama need to complete their examinations for life prolongation. Now, the greatest issue, fireproofing of cables, is almost solved. The final approval to the life extension of Units 1 and 2 is in sight.
The issue of power cables not being fire resistant can be found at many other old NPPs as well. Thus, many other old NPPs will have to resort to similar safety measures.

Actually, with this issue of fire proofing cables, Kansai Electric made a big “flamer” of itself before. To the measures it proposed earlier, the Nuclear Regulation Authority responded with very harsh criticisms, saying: “There is no evidence of safety,” and “Not trustable,” on May 26^th, 2015.

(Quote from the relevant article of the Asahi Shimbun’s May 27^th, 2015, edition.)
“In its examinations of whether or not to permit the restart of Kansai Electric Power’s Units 1 and 2 of the Takahama NPP, the Nuclear Regulation Authority, on May 26^th, harshly rebuked—“There is no evidence of safety,” “Not trustable,” etc.—the power company’s claim that painting non-fireproof cables with some special paint can satisfy the required fireproof standard. At the examination meeting held that day, the power company said it had confirmed that covering up cables with fireproof paint or with fireproof sheets would provide enough fire resistance. To this claim, the examiners of the Authority responded with a harsh rebuke, saying: “The experiment data are too small in quantity and provide no proof. With such little data, we are unable to make an objective judgment.” The examiners also pointed out examples where some fireproofing paint, tried by some other NPPs, crumbled, saying: “Cable maintenance and control have been utterly miserable so far. How can we trust you when you say you will thoroughly tighten up your control of cables?” Kansai Electric replied repeatedly, “We will make more detailed explanations.”

Elsewhere, at TEPCO’s Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP (Niigata), some cables to the safety equipment were, against the new regulations, not separated from other cables. However, in the examination papers TEPCO submitted to the Authority for Units 6 and 7, the power company wrongly claimed that “some measures were taken for safety” with respect to the cables in question.
(From an article of the December 9^th, 2015 edition of the Fukushim Minpo newspaper)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

The Authority’s examinations are a prerequisite to the restart of a NPP. However, the Authority did not expect an electric company to include an untrue statement in the application documents. Thus, the Authority did not confirm the state of the cables in question at the sites. This reveals serious limitations to the examinations conducted by the Nuclear Regulation Authority.

The new regulations for NPPs require that the cables to/from safety equipment be separated from the other cables. Boards or some other objects must stand in between those two types of cables. At Units 6 and 7 of the Kashiwazaki-Kariwa NPP, however, at least 296 cables in all were not protected by separation.
Still, the application for approval of the work plan, submitted in September 2013 by TEPCO, who wants to restart the two units, explicitly stated that “the two types of cables are laid down with separate cable trays and conduits,” and “we have taken measures to alleviate mutual interferences between the two types, keeping the two independent of each other.”
In reality, TEPCO did some faulty work, for instance, placing cables of different types in trays that also held cables to the safety equipment. The power company said, “We wrongly believed that we had taken the right measures. We did not confirm that sufficiently.”
The Authority, in August, chose Kashiwazaki-Kariwa’s Units 6 and 7 as priority units to examine, among all the boiling water reactors subject to inspection. (Fukushima Daiichi is another example of boiling water reactors.) The Authority, however, was unaware of this cable placement issue, until TEPCO reported on it in September 2015. Similar problems have been discovered at Unit 4 of Chubu Electric Power’s Hamaoka NPP and at Unit 1 of Hokuriku Electric Power’s Shika NPP.

At Chernobyl, some structural problems and human errors worked together to create one of the worst NPP accidents in human history. It is now evident that, prior to the disaster, the relevant parties gave precedence to economy over safety and covered up many wrongdoings.
On December 26^th, 1985, the Soviets celebrated an anniversary of the nuclear power industry, and they hoped to finish off Unit 4 of the Chernobyl plant by then. To accelerate the building work, therefore, they replaced some inflammable heat-resistant material with a flammable one, which was one factor that helped spread radioactive substances.

Japan’s Nuclear Regulation Authority’s examinations can seriously affect the future of everyone in Japan. While pressure from the national government is affecting the Authority’s inspections and judgments as the government turns back to nuclear power, Japan’s general society is not responding as it should. To me, this looks like the calm before a deadly storm.

Original Japanese written by  staffer
The English below translated from the original Japanese by Heeday
The English translation edited by Rev. Dr. Henry French, ELCA

(Based on articles from the December 13, 2015 editions of the Asahi Shimbun and Akahata newspapers)
▼Click each image and read the caption.

Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe met his Indian counterpart, Prime Minister Modi, on December 12, 2015, and reached a “basic agreement” to sign a nuclear agreement between the two nations which would enable Japan to export both its nuclear technology and its bullet train technology to India.

A nuclear agreement permits the signing countries to im/export radioactive substances and nuclear technologies only for peaceful use. Currently, Japan has signed such an agreement with 14 countries and regions. The negotiations with India began five years ago, in 2010.
India plans to build 40 more nuclear power plants (NPPs) by 2032, and expand its NPPs’ power generation capacity to 63 million kW, more than ten times greater than what the nation has today. India has already signed a nuclear agreement with the US, France, and others. Here we have to note that all the pressure vessels of reactors from the US or France are made in Japan. Thus, in reality, unless India signs such a deal with Japan as well, its agreements with the US and France become meaningless.
Now, India has conducted nuclear bomb tests before, and it is not part of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty. Many, therefore, are calling for a more cautious attitude to the India-Japan agreement, including, among others, the mayors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki who jointly petitioned to suspend the negotiations for the agreement, in that the proposed agreement “generates suspicions that the imported nuclear technologies will be used in the development of nuclear weapons.” Also, inside Japan, many are saying that “the nation should not export a NPP,” considering the disaster that the meltdown of TEPCO’s Fukushima Daiichi caused.
According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), India owns nuclear weapons, some 90 to 110 such weapons as of January 2015. NPPs imported from Japan can help India develop more nuclear warheads. In the negotiations, Japan has been claiming the deal is compatible with the non-proliferation policy, saying that the deal lets the International Atomic energy Agency (IAEA) inspect to prevent any military use of nuclear technologies imported from Japan. Also, if India holds a nuclear bomb test, Japan will suspend its cooperation with India, says Japan. However, the IAEA is capable of inspecting only some of the nuclear facilities in India, not all of them.
Thus, no one can guarantee whether or not India is honest in its announcements.
Moreover, India has been in tension with its neighbor, Pakistan. Once the border situation changes, India might resume its nuclear bomb tests and/or expand its nuclear weapons.

Once contaminated with radioactivity, no human and no part of nature can return to a contamination-free state again. The fallout from Fukushima Daiichi and the damages caused from the fallout can harm many for ages to come, and no human can predict how many generations will be victimized. In the years to come, the meltdown might well contaminate much of the Pacific and beyond, as many fear.

Today, Japan has yet to resolve the Fukushima Daiichi catastrophe while, under pressure from some pro-nuke people inside Japan, the government eagerly attempts to sell NPPs to a country with nuclear weapons. I do believe this should not be tolerated.